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FOREWORD: LOVING LAWRENCE 
Pamela S. Karlan* 
When you come to a fork in the road, take it. 
- Lawrence Peter (Yogi) Berra 
Two interracial couples. Two cases. Two clauses. In Loving v. 
Virginia,1 the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statute outlawing 
interracial marriage. In Lawrence v. Texas,2 the Court struck down a 
Texas statute outlawing sexual activity between same-sex individuals. 
Each case raised challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Loving marked the crystallization, a dozen years after Brown,3 of 
the antisubordination principle: Virginia's law ran afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause because it reflected nothing more than arbitrary and 
invidious discrimination "designed to maintain White Supremacy."4 In 
reaching that conclusion, the Court employed a then-novel 
formulation: strict scrutiny.5 Chief Justice Warren noted that in cases 
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law 
School. B.A. 1980, Yale University; M.A. 1984, Yale University; J.D. 1984, Yale University. 
- Ed. Some of the ideas in this essay grow out of my work on the constitutional law 
professors' amicus brief in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); those ideas were 
sharpened significantly by suggestions from my co-counsel Bill Rubenstein; from my clients; 
from Lawrence's lawyers, Ruth Harlow, Susan Sommer, Paul Smith, and Bill Hohengarten; 
and from Suzanne Goldberg, who also shared the draft of her article Equality Without Tiers, 
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004). I also appreciate several helpful suggestions from Viola 
Canales, Alexi Lahav, Mike Seidman, and Kathleen Sullivan. 
I have been thinking about many of the issues in this essay at least since I had the 
privilege of clerking for Justice Harry A. Blackmun and working on his dissent in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986). The genesis for this essay is in part the Justice's 
observation that the "parallel between Loving" and the argument surrounding the 
criminalization of gay sexual intimacy "is almost uncanny." Id. at 210 n.5. In the last 
paragraph of his dissent, the Justice expressed his hope that "the Court soon will reconsider 
its analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how 
to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply 
rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do." Id. at 214. I 
am sorry that he did not live to see that hope triumph. 
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
2. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). For discussion of this crystallization, see Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of 
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991). 
4. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
5. As my colleague Michael Klarman noted, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), 
which struck down a Florida law that criminalized interracial cohabitation, marked the first 
1447 
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"involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has 
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the 
discriminations"; by contrast, in cases involving racial classifications, 
the Equal Protection Clause imposes a "very heavy burden of 
justification. "6 
But Loving was not simply an equal protection case. Rather, the 
case represents a turning point, as the Court moved from the 
completed project of imposing strict scrutiny on racial classifications 
toward a new project of applying strict scrutiny to limitations on 
fundamental rights. In its final two paragraphs, Loving marked the 
rebirth of substantive due process: Virginia, the Court declared, had 
"deprive[d] the Lovings of liberty without due process of law" by 
denying them the "freedom to marry [that] has long been recognized 
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men. "7 
Today, most courts and scholars see the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses as discrete bases for strict scrutiny.8 But in Loving, the 
two clauses operated in tandem. For example, in articulating its Due 
Process Clause-based argument, the Court relied on Skinner v. 
Oklahoma,9 an equal protection decision, for the proposition that 
marriage "is one of the basic civil rights of man. "10 It explained that 
"[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as 
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so 
time that the Court "both articulated and applied a more rigorous review standard to racial 
classifications." Klarman, supra note 3, at 255. Loving marked the second. See id. 
6. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9. As the Court explained: 
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially 
suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," and, if they are ever to 
be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible 
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. 
Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted). 
The current formulation of the test is that racial classifications are constitutional "only if 
they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests." Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337-38 (2003). Loving is, of course, still frequently cited for this 
proposition. For recent examples, see id. at 2337 and Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 
(1995). 
7. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. Thus, Loving is seen today as a critical point in the revival of 
substantive due process. It is often cited for the proposition that Jaws that infringe on a 
fundamental liberty interest trigger strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. For recent 
examples, see M.L.B. v. S.L.J. , 519 U.S. 102, 115 (1996), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
94-95 (1987). 
8. I develop this point at length in Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and 
the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002) [hereinafter 
Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment]. 
9. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
10. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
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directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of 
liberty without due process of law."11 This use of equal protection 
decisions to inform conceptions of liberty, and vice versa, was a 
hallmark of the Warren Court.12 
In this Essay, I argue that Lawrence resembles Loving in important 
ways. Like Loving, Lawrence marks a crystallization of doctrine. 
Nearly forty years after Griswold v. Connecticut13 and Loving, the 
Court has clearly established the principle that "the substantive reach 
of liberty" under the Due Process Clause extends to the way 
individuals choose to conduct their intimate relationships.14 But just as 
Loving was a case about inequality that informed the jurisprudence of 
liberty, Lawrence is a case about liberty that has important 
implications for the jurisprudence of equality. In fact, liberty and 
equality are more intertwined in Lawrence than in Loving. The 
Loving Court could have rested its decision entirely on the 
unconstitutionality of racial subordination without looking at all at the 
importance of marriage; by contrast, the Lawrence Court's discussion 
of liberty would be incoherent without some underlying commitment 
to equality among groups. The Warren Court often espoused 
"substantive" equal protection; the Lawrence Court attacked a 
"suspect" deprivation of liberty. 
Lawrence relates to Loving in yet another important way. Loving 
drew a clear distinction between rationality review and heightened 
scrutiny. Lawrence, by contrast, sidesteps this conventional doctrinal 
framework. Loving reflected the emergence of strict scrutiny under 
11. Id. 
12. Loving was decided the year after Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966), in which the Court employed heightened scrutiny to strike down Virginia's 
imposition of a poll tax as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, in part because the poll 
tax infringed upon the right to vote - "a fundamental matter in a free and democratic 
society." Id. at 667. Even today, the Court's voting rights cases continue to rest on a notion 
of "substantive equal protection" that looks very much like a species of fundamental liberty 
amenable to substantive due process review. See Karlan, The Stereoscopic Fourteenth 
Amendment, supra note 8; see also Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 992-93 (1979) (suggesting that most of the Warren 
Court's equal protection decisions seemed inextricably linked to the Court's concern with 
underlying substantive interests such as education, fairness in criminal proceedings, or the 
right to travel interstate). 
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2476. In this sense, like Loving, Lawrence was a 
case whose time had come - indeed, was long overdue. As with Loving, the country had 
moved ahead of the Court. In the seventeen years since the Court's decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), half the states that had then criminalized oral and anal sex 
repealed their laws, and the remaining states virtually never enforced them. See Lawrence, 
123 S. Ct. at 2481. Even Justice Thomas in dissent described Texas's law as "uncommonly 
silly" and said that if he were a legislator, he would vote to repeal it. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 
2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
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both the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses; Lawrence, 
however, does to due process analysis something very similar to what 
the Court's previous gay-rights decision, Romer v. Evans,15 did to 
equal protection analysis: it undermines the traditional tiers of 
scrutiny altogether. This approach reflects more than simply the fact 
that the two opinions share the same author. Both Lawrence and 
Romer v. Evans express an "analogical crisis."16 Gay rights cases "just 
can't be steered readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality 
track,"17 let alone onto the due process/conduct or the equal 
protection/status track. Cases about race created the modern 
framework of heightened scrutiny; cases about sexual orientation may 
transform it. 
I. THE SOLUTION LA WREN CE OFFERS 
In prior substantive due process cases, the Supreme Court had 
stressed the importance of providing "a careful description of the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest."18 If the liberty interest is 
fundamental, then strict scrutiny applies: a reviewing court can uphold 
the government's restriction only if "the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. "19 Lawrence marks a 
striking departure from this approach. First, with respect to the liberty 
interest at issue, the Court was magisterial but vague. Second, the 
Court never reached the question whether to apply strict scrutiny. At 
its core, the liberty interest at issue in Lawrence is the right of gay 
people to equal respect for their life choices. The reason the level of 
scrutiny did not matter is that laws that reflect nothing more than 
class-based animosity against gay people lack even a legitimate 
15. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
16. I take this concept from an essay by my colleague Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post­
Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 
(1993). 
17. Id. 
18. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Reno v. Hores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S 261, 277-80 (1990). As Justice 
Thomas remarked in Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003), "vague generalities . . .  will 
not suffice." Id. at 2006 (opinion of Thomas, J.). 
October Term 2002 was quite a year for Justice Kennedy and substantive due process. 
His opinion for the Court in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 
1513 (2003), further refined the Court's application of substantive due process (albeit not 
fundamental-rights substantive due process) to punitive damages cases. And in Chavez v. 
Martinez, Justice Kennedy argued that the manner in which the police had interrogated a 
wounded suspect violated his "fundamental right to liberty of the person." 123 S. Ct. at 2016 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
19. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Flores, 507 U.S. at 302. 
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government purpose20 - a conclusion that, whatever the Court's 
doctrinal handle, sounds in equal protection.21 
A logical starting point in thinking about the liberty interest upon 
which a law infringes is to look at the conduct the law forbids. In 
challenges to laws restricting abortion, for example, the fundamental 
liberty involved is usually treated as the right to terminate a pregnancy 
or to decide whether to bear a child. That was decidedly not the tack 
the Court took in Lawrence. Section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code 
made it a crime for individuals of the same sex to engage in a specified 
list of sexual acts,22 but the Court vehemently rejected the view that 
the liberty interest at issue was "simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct."23 That view, the Court declared: 
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a 
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to 
have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be 
sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual 
act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching 
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual 
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do 
seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose 
without being punished as criminals. 24 
Part of the Court's response was simply to ratchet up the level of 
generality at which the liberty interest was described: rather than 
having a constitutional right to engage in oral or anal sex, individuals 
have a constitutionally protected interest in creating a "personal 
relationship"2 5 in which "sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person. "2 6 But the Court's approach was actually 
even more sweeping, as it straddled the conventional distinction 
20. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
21. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); United 
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) made it a crime for a person to 
"engag[e] in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." Another 
provision, section 21.01(1), defined "deviate sexual intercourse" to include "any contact 
between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; 
or . . .  the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." 
23. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. To be sure, in cases like Griswold and Roe, the Court's motivation for finding a 
right to use contraception or to terminate a pregnancy rested on its sense of the importance 
of marital intimacy or the decision whether to bear a child to the more generalized interest 
in the overall contours of a person's life. But the right itself was defined narrowly. 
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between negative and positive conceptions of liberty.27 Although the 
opinion's opening lines characterized liberty as "protect[ing] the 
person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or 
other private places,"28 the opinion ranged far beyond treating liberty 
as merely the "absence of interference" by the state,29 or "the right to 
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men."30 Most of the opinion relied on a more 
positive notion of liberty as involving the ability to be "a doer -
deciding, not being decided for, self-directed . . . [and capable] of 
playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of 
[one's] own and realizing them."31 And so the Court described the 
liberty at issue as gay people's right to "control their destiny,"32 
because "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life."33 
By moving away from conceiving of liberty as involving distinct 
conduct, the Court recast the right as involving not just autonomy but 
equality as well. As a practical matter, the major effect of section 21.06 
surely was not its interference with gay people's love lives. The law 
was virtually never enforced34 - at least not against the kind of 
27. I take these terms from ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS 
ON LIBERTY 118, 122-34 (1969). 
28. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. 
29. B ERLIN, supra note 27, at 127. 
30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
31. B ERLIN, supra note 27, at 131. 
32. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
33. Id. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)). Mike Seidman noticed a positive cast to Justice Kennedy's approach in Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), as well. See Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The 
Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70 (suggesting that 
Justice Kennedy "used equal protection doctrine to attack constitutional law's traditional 
conservative bias in favor of negative rights"); id. at 82 (suggesting that one reading of 
Romer "seems to impose an affirmative constitutional requirement on jurisdictions to 
protect gay people from private discrimination, at least so long as they maintain 
comprehensive protection for other groups" as well as suggesting that "if gay people are 
entitled to affirmative protection, then surely they are entitled to negative freedom from 
government persecution as well"). 
In a recent email, Seidman commented to me that he didn't think that Lawrence could 
fairly be read to adopt a positive conception of liberty if that means that "the government 
ha[s] an affirmative obligation to provide gay people (or anyone else) with the means to 
achieve" control over their destiny. Email from Michael Seidman to the author (July 2, 2004) 
(on file with author). Seidman is clearly correct that the government need not provide all (or 
even most) of the tangible means necessary to control one's destiny. But I still think that 
Lawrence does at the very least suggest - in the same way that Seidman argues that Romer 
suggested - the possibility that the government must take at least some affirmative steps to 
provide gay people with the same liberties it provides to all others. 
34. In an earlier civil action challenging section 21.06, the Texas Supreme Court had 
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing based on "the Attorney General's contention that § 
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behavior the Court was prepared to protect.35 It's hard to imagine that 
the law had any activity-level effects on nonpublic, consensual 
behavior at all.3 6 Statutes banning private, consensual sexual activity 
are thus quite different from the laws at issue in the Court's previous 
autonomy cases. A law banning the sale of contraceptives, like the 
laws at issue in Griswold37 or Eisenstadt v. Baird,38 or a law restricting 
the right to abortion, like the laws at issue in Roe v. Wade39 or Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,40 is far more likely to interfere with individual 
behavior because it operates by deterring third parties - pharmacists, 
doctors, and medical institutions - from providing necessary goods or 
services. By contrast, the fact that states make virtually no effort to 
enforce criminal prohibitions on private gay sexual activity makes it 
implausible to see the statutes as actually directed at the acts 
themselves.41 
The real problems with prohibitions on same-sex intimacy, then, 
come from the collateral consequences of such laws: the way in which 
they undergird "discrimination both in the public and in the private 
spheres"42 and tell gay people that their choices about how to live their 
lives are unworthy of respect. For example, public employers have 
refused to hire gay men and lesbians on the assumption that they are 
all lawbreakers, without regard to whether any individual applicant 
has actually been charged with, or convicted of, violating a prohibition 
21.06 has not been, and in all probability will not be, enforced against private consensual 
conduct between adults." State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994). 
35. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (declaring that: "The present case does not involve 
minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct 
or prostitution."). 
36. According to the 2000 census, nearly 86,000 adults in Texas lived with a 
partner of the same sex. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., SOME DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GAY COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2003), http:// 
wwwl.law.ucla.edu/erg/pubs/GD/GayDemographics.pdf. It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that there were thousands of violations of the law every day. 
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
38. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
41. Compare Poe v. Ullman, where Justice Harlan explained, in the context of a pre-
Griswold challenge to Connecticut's ban on the sale of contraceptives, that 
[ t Jo me the very circumstance that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of 
this statute against individual users, while it nevertheless persists in asserting its right to do 
so at any time - in effect a right to hold this statute as an imminent threat to the privacy of 
the households of the State - conduces to the inference either that it does not consider the 
policy of the statute a very important one, or that it does not regard the means it has chosen 
for its effectuation as appropriate or necessary. 
367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
42 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003). 
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on same-sex intimacy.43 Similarly, courts deciding custody issues have 
sometimes restricted gay men and lesbians' parental rights on the 
grounds that parents involved in same-sex relationships are 
presumptively engaging in illegal activity.44 
I suppose one could describe this problem as one of 
unconstitutional conditions - gay people should not have to sacrifice 
their right to love one another to get jobs or retain parental rights 4 5  -
but that seems a strained and artificial way of understanding the 
connection between gay people's sex lives and the discrimination they 
face. It's hard to imagine that hostile government actors would be 
assuaged by a gay person's insistence that his or her sexual activity did 
not take precisely the form prohibited by a particular criminal statute. 
In Shahar v. Bowers,46 for example, when the court of appeals upheld 
the Georgia attorney general's decision to rescind a job offer to an 
attorney who had participated in a religious marriage ceremony with 
her partner, the court found it unnecessary even to decide whether the 
plaintiff "has engaged in sodomy within the meaning of Georgia law" 
because "reasonable persons may suspect that having a Staff Attorney 
who is part of a same-sex 'marriage' is the same thing as having a Staff 
Attorney who violates the State's law against homosexual sodomy."47 
Ironically, the very passage in which the Lawrence majority 
explained why it was not reaching Lawrence's equal protection claim 
shows the centrality of an equal protection sensibility to the Court's 
due process analysis: 
43. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane); Dallas v. 
England, 846 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App. 1993) (describing refusal of Dallas Police 
Department to hire gay people on the grounds they had violated the state's Homosexual 
Conduct Law); Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 
TEXAS L. REV. 813, 828-33, 835-38 (2001) (discussing additional, similar cases); Christopher 
R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) (discussing the various ways in which formally 
unenforced sodomy statutes lead to discriminatory treatment of gay people generally). 
44. See, e.g., Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998); Tucker v. Tucker, 910 
P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah 1996); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985). Notably, courts 
often take this position with respect to gay and lesbian parents even in states that have 
facially neutral prohibitions on oral or anal sex. 
45. Elsewhere, I have suggested: 
The state cannot demand that a person sacrifice the constitutionally protected freedom "to 
choose the form and nature of the intensely personal bonds" that "make individuals what 
they are" in order to enjoy "protections taken for granted by most people . . .  against 
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute 
ordinary civic life in a free society." 
Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Justice 
Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 66 (1998) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)). 
46. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane). 
47. Id. at 1105 n.17. 
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Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause 
some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn 
differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and 
different-sex participants. 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for 
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does 
so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might 
remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection 
reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the 
private spheres.48 
The precise concern the Court identifies is the possibility that 
basing its decision solely on the Equal Protection Clause might permit 
states to reenact sweeping prohibitions on oral and anal sex that would 
continue to disadvantage gay people. But the Court's concern fails to 
understand the implications of an equal protection holding: if the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids states from criminalizing oral and 
anal sex between same-sex partners when it does not also criminalize 
oral and anal sex between different-sex partners, it must be because 
there is no constitutionally acceptable basis for differentiating the acts 
on the basis of the sex of the people performing them. But if this is 
true, then there would also be no constitutionally acceptable basis for 
enforcing a neutral statute only against gay people.49 
Nearly a quarter of the Court's analysis was devoted to an 
extensive discussion of the history of laws directed at sexual activity.50 
There, too, the Court's discussion of liberty bled almost seamlessly 
into an invocation of equality. A central problem with Bowers v. 
48. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482. 
49. Cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). As Justice Blackmun pointed out in 
his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202 n.2 (1986), a state's decision to 
prosecute only homosexual activity under a facially neutral statute where the sex of the 
participants is irrelevant to the legality of the acts would raise serious equal protection 
concerns completely independent of the question whether sexual orientation involves a 
suspect class. Perhaps all the Court was doing was trying to avoid potential problems in 
proving the impermissible motives and selective prosecutions that would occur under a 
facially neutral statute by outlawing prosecutions altogether. 
50. Rhetorically, then, the Court's strategy in Lawrence was quite reminiscent of 
Loving. Compare Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 ("In summary, the historical grounds relied 
upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by 
Chief Justice Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the 
very least, are overstated."), with Loving, 388 U.S. at 9 ("As for the various statements 
directly concerning the [racial-intermarriage views held by the drafters of the] Fourteenth 
Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that although these 
historical sources 'cast some light' they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; '[a]t best, 
they are inconclusive.' " (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954))). 
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Hardwick, the Lawrence Court suggested, lay in its assumption that 
because proscriptions against sodomy "have ancient roots," 51 gay 
people could not assert that their ability to choose the form and nature 
of their intimate lives implicated a fundamental liberty interest. The 
Court emphasized the absence of a "longstanding history in this 
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter." 5 2 
Rather, the laws reflected "a general condemnation of nonprocreative 
sex." 53 In short, history suggested that all individuals, straight and gay, 
had possessed equal (and for much of our history, equally limited) 
rights to engage in nonmarital, non-procreative sex. 
The Court's decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe 
had dramatically expanded constitutionally protected autonomy. 
Ironically, these decisions, which removed barriers that 
disproportionately affected straight individuals, enhanced the 
possibility for a formal legal gap between the activities of straight and 
gay couples. At the oral argument in Lawrence, Paul Smith pointed 
out to the Court that while it had "left open for nearly 30 years the 
question of whether anybody ... has a privacy right to engage in 
consensual sexual intimacy in the privacy of their home . . . the 
American people [had] moved on to the point where that right is 
taken for granted for everyone. " 5 4  The real question in Lawrence was 
whether gay people should be included in the idea of "everyone." Far 
from being deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, then, 
"American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the 
last third of the 20th century." 5 5 Notice the Court's language: the laws 
"target[ed] . . .  couples." This is the language of inequality, not the 
language of simple rights deprivation.56 
51. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. 
52 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
53. Id. at 2479. 
54. Oral Argument of Paul M. Smith at 24, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) 
(No. 02-102), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/ 02-102.pdf. 
55. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479. 
56. The central insight of Justice Jackson's concurrence in Railway Express Agency, Inc. 
v. New York, seems especially relevant here. Justice Jackson observed that 
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government 
than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority be 
imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as 
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and 
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers 
were affected. 
336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949). Few states today formally treat gay and straight sexual activity 
differently. Given contemporary notions of privacy, it seems far more plausible that the 
straight majority would liberalize restrictions on gay sexual behavior so that gay people 
enjoy the same level of autonomy straight people possess than that states would impose new 
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The oscillation between equality- and liberty-based approaches in 
the generation since Bowers v. Hardwick reflects more than simply the 
tactical decisions of courts and litigators to use whichever clause 
seemed nearer to hand. The situation of gay people provokes an 
"analogical crisis"57 because in some ways it involves regulation of 
particular acts in which gay people engage, and so seems most 
amenable to analysis under the liberty prong of the Due Process 
Clause, while in other ways it involves regulation of a group of people 
who are defined not so much by what they do in the privacy of their 
bedrooms, but by who they are in the public sphere. As the Court 
itself phrased the issue, "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made 
criminal ... that declaration ... is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination." 58 It is hard to substitute other adjectives for 
"homosexual" and continue to have the sentence make sense. No one, 
for example, would modify both "conduct" and "persons" with words 
like "larcenous" or "perjurious" or even, although it might be less 
initially jarring, "violent." As I shall suggest in a moment, this must be 
in part because homosexuality straddles the line between conduct and 
status in ways that make it hard to apply conventional constitutional 
doctrine. A state cannot make it a crime to "be gay" since the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits states from criminalizing a particular status in 
the absence of "any antisocial behavior." 59 So a state that wants to 
express its disapproval of gay people must instead craft a law that 
makes it a crime to engage in behaviors connected in some way with 
being gay. But the fact that the law explicitly targets behavior and not 
persons does not mean that it is not also class legislation. In this 
regard, antisodomy statutes resemble late-nineteenth-century voter­
eligibility statutes that states like Mississippi and Alabama enacted. In 
Ratliff v. Beale,(,() the Mississippi Supreme Court explained that the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from simply barring all blacks 
from voting. But, for a variety of reasons, blacks possessed 
"peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character, which clearly 
distinguished" them from whites, 61 ranging from moving more 
frequently to committing certain crimes.62 Thus, the state 
restrictions on straight sexual activity in order to continue their existing restrictions on gay 
sexual activity. 
57. See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 297. 
58. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (emphasis added). 
59. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 
60. 20 So. 865 (Miss. 1896). 
61. Ratliff, 20 So. at 868. 
62. Many of the "distinctions" were based on crude sociological speculation that black 
lawbreakers were "given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the whites." 
Id.; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (holding that an Alabama 
constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of certain misdemeanors of 
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constitutional convention set eligibility standards for voting that relied 
on these distinctions: "Restrained by the federal constitution from 
discriminating against the negro race, the convention discriminated 
against its characteristics and the offenses to which its weaker 
members were prone."63 Even more than statutes that targeted 
migratory individuals or bigamists, statutes that target same-sex 
behavior are directed at a class whose primary characteristic is not its 
engagement in discrete acts but its existence as a subordinate social 
group. 
In this sense, Justice Scalia's hyperbolic dissent, with its warning 
that Lawrence casts doubt on laws prohibiting adult incest or 
bestiality,64 misses the mark. While those laws unquestionably prevent 
some individuals from engaging in some behavior - perhaps even 
behavior that seems absolutely central to their definitions of 
themselves - that behavior is not tied as an empirical matter in 
contemporary America to membership in a recognized social group. 
By contrast, gay people in the United States do form a social group 
whose membership extends beyond their engaging in specific sexual 
acts. Paradoxically, it is precisely the fact that gay behavior does not 
take place solely within individuals' bedrooms that may have led the 
Court to recognize gay people's entitlement to constitutional 
protection. Protecting gay people's choices within the intimacy of their 
homes serves essentially as a safeguard of their dignity in a more 
public sphere. That, whatever the Court chooses to call it, is as much a 
claim about equality as it is a claim about liberty. 
II. THE PROBLEM LAWRENCE LEAVES 
So what accounts for the Court's resistance to grounding its 
decision in the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Due Process 
moral turpitude violated the Equal Protection Clause because the list of disenfranchising 
misdemeanors was picked because they "were thought to be more commonly committed by 
blacks"). Ironically, in Hunter, among the crimes that triggered disenfranchisement were 
"sodomy" and "crimes against nature," because nineteenth-century white planters believed 
that these were acts blacks were more likely to commit than were whites. See Hunter, 471 
U.S. at 232. 
63. Ratliff, 20 So. at 868. In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222-24 (1898), the 
Supreme Court, in one of the most intellectually dishonest opinions in its history, relied on 
the Mississippi Supreme Court's reasoning to hold that the Mississippi statutes did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the restrictions on the right to vote "reach weak 
and vicious white men as well as weak and vicious black men, and whatever is sinister in 
their intention, if anything, can be prevented by both races by the exertion of that duty 
which . . .  refrains from crime." Id. at 222. In this sense, Mississippi's argument resembled 
Texas's argument in Lawrence that the "facially neutral conduct prohibitions" of the Texas 
statute meant that "everyone in Texas is foreclosed from having deviate sexual intercourse 
with another person of the same sex." Brief for Respondents at 34, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 
S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). 
64. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490. 
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Clause, the way Loving did? The simplest explanation may be the 
Court's concern with the potential reach of an equal protection 
decision. Lurking only slightly under the surface in Lawrence was the 
question that Loving had finally addressed after a decade's evasion by 
a cautious Supreme Court: 6 5  what limitations does the Fourteenth 
Amendment impose on state decisions about who can marry whom? 
The Court seemed at pains to disclaim any implications of its decision 
for the question whether states could limit marriage to opposite-sex 
couples. Consider, for example, the number of hedges in this 
articulation of the nature of gay people's constitutionally protected 
liberty interest: statutes that regulate private, consensual sexual 
conduct 
seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose 
without being punished as criminals. 
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, 
or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its 
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law 
protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter 
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private 
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. 66 
The Court may have sensed that liberty interests can be analyzed 
individually, or at least one at a time: after all, the Court had 
recognized the right of married couples to use contraceptives a 
number of years before it recognized the right of unmarried 
65. A decade before Loving, the Court had dodged precisely the same issue, 
disingenuously denying that a challenge to the Virginia law raised a federal question. See 
Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand 90 S.E.2d 849 
(Va.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). For discussions of Nairn and the Court's 
decision, see, for example, William N. Eskridge, Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the 
Jurisprudence of Civil Union, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 875 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW cix-cx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); 
Klarman, supra note 3, at 243; David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 578 (1985). Apparently, at the time of Nairn, the Court feared that addressing the 
politically incendiary question of interracial marriage would undercut its effectiveness in 
enforcing the broad principle of racial equality so recently announced in Brown. The fact 
that by 1967, another fourteen states had repealed their prohibitions on interracial marriage, 
leaving only a few reactionary outliers, perhaps reassured the Court that its ruling would 
reinforce rather than undermine its position on race discrimination generally. Cf Lawrence, 
123 S. Ct. at 2480-81 (noting that "[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct 
referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13" as one of the factors suggesting 
"an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding 
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex"). 
66. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added). 
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individuals to use them,67 and the Court recognized the fundamental 
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment long before it implicitly 
recognized· the fundamental right to palliative care.68 Thus, even if 
"the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life,"69 the Court has not yet recognized - and almost certainly never 
will - that individuals have an absolute constitutionally protected 
interest in following their individually defined bliss. As an empirical 
matter, the Court is most likely to recognize rights which reflect the 
practices of large numbers of people whose lives the Court otherwise 
finds worthy of respect. And these rights are likely to expand 
incrementally, rather than dramatically.70 
By contrast to the incremental possibilities of fundamental 
rights/due process-based strict scrutiny, suspect classification/equal 
protection-based strict scrutiny seems far more binary: either a group 
is entitled to heightened scrutiny across the board or it isn't. The 
Court may have feared that if it struck down Texas's statute on the 
ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to treat gay people 
differently from straight people, this would require it to invalidate all 
laws that treat gay and straight couples differently, the most obvious 
of which are laws restricting the right to marry. Whatever "the 
consistency of the direction of change" with respect to laws targeting 
homosexual conduct over the last seventeen years,71 there has been no 
similar consistency with respect to the tremendous ferment over 
marriage laws. 
Of course, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurrence, 
which also carefully avoided the marriage question,72 Texas's law 
could be analyzed, and struck down, without reaching the question 
67. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which extended the right to use contra­
ceptives to unmarried individuals, was decided seven years after Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), which recognized the right of married couples to use birth control. 
68. Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), with Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
69. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
70. Bill Eskridge makes a related point in a splendid essay. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1201-17 
(2000). 
71. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (relying on this factor in discerning the 
"national consensus" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment). 
72. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Unlike the moral 
disapproval of same-sex relations - the asserted state interest in this case - other reasons 
exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded 
group.") Notably, Justice O'Connor did not mention what those non-censorious reasons 
might be. Of course, there are many reasons to promote the institution of marriage; the real 
question is whether any of those reasons justifies restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples. 
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whether gay people constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Given 
its almost complete non-enforcement as a conduct-based statute, 
section 21.06 served simply to express "negative attitudes, or fear" of 
gay people.73 Even more than the provision struck down in Romer v. 
Evans, section 21.06 was "inexplicable by anything but animus toward 
the class it affects."74 Thus, the Texas law failed even rationality 
review, which requires, at the very least, that a state law be related to 
some legitimate interest: as the Supreme Court had held thirty years 
earlier with respect to a law that targeted hippies - a far more 
evanescent class than gay people - "a bare . .. desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest."75 
Moreover, another decision handed down the same week as 
Lawrence suggests that even suspect-classification strict scrutiny may 
be more fluid than Gerald Gunther's famous aphorism suggests.76 In 
Grutter v. Bollinger,77 the Court applied strict scrutiny and upheld the 
University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious affirmative-action 
plan, holding that diversity was a compelling governmental interest 
and that the plan was tailored narrowly enough to justify its explicit 
reliance on race. The Court was clearly swayed by context: the bulk of 
the Court's discussion of the state interest in diversity focused on 
issues of particular salience to elite institutions of higher education 
that train the nation's future leaders. Similarly, in the race-conscious 
redistricting cases of the 1990s and early 2000s, the Supreme Court 
modified strict scrutiny both by narrowing the domain in which strict 
scrutiny comes into play at all and by broadening the constellation of 
interests that can justify using race as a factor in crafting electoral 
districts.78 If the Court is moving toward a world in which tiered 
73. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
74. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
75. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). In O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, the Court observed: 
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to 
those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, 
could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public 
intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical 
liberty. 
422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
76. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (suggesting that 
strict scrutiny has been "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"). 
77. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
78. For an extensive treatment of this evolution, see Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the 
Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1569 (2002). For an exceptionally comprehensive discussion of the more general 
shift in heightened scrutiny, see Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481 (2004). 
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scrutiny no longer operates mechanically - a possibility raised by 
decisions ranging from Romer v. Evans and Nguyen v. INS19 to the 
voting cases and Grutter - then we might expect equal protection 
scrutiny of laws that treat individuals differently based on their sexual 
orientations to be similarly contextual and incremental. 
In any event, the Court cannot escape the question by grounding 
its decision in due process liberty interests rather than in equal 
protection anti-subordination concerns. Whatever else it may be, 
marriage is certainly a practice that defines many individuals' 
conceptions of their own existence.80 Thus, either the Court or the 
political process ultimately will have to resolve the question whether 
gay people's fundamental liberty interest in strengthening "enduring" 
personal bonds81 includes a right to invoke the state's assistance 
through the institution of marriage. 
The months since Lawrence have seen tremendous ferment on this 
issue, ranging from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 
decisions requiring the state to permit same-sex couples to marry,82 to 
San Francisco's issuance of thousands of marriage licenses to gay 
couples,83 to President Bush's proposal for a constitutional amendment 
79. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). In Nguyen, the Supreme Court upheld the differential treatment 
of children born overseas to unmarried mothers who were U.S. citizens and unmarried 
fathers who were U.S. citizens based on its conclusion that the differential requirements for 
obtaining U.S. citizenship were justified by two important government interests, and thus 
that the statute survived intermediate scrutiny. I happen to think that the decision in Nguyen 
was incorrect, for precisely the reasons advanced by the dissent. But the broader point 
remains: in yet another case, the level of scrutiny did not mechanically control the outcome. 
80. In Lawrence, the Court described the choices its decision protected in these terms: 
In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in 
making these choices, we stated as follows: "These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life." 
123 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)). In Griswold, the Court described marriage in similar language: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to 
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a 
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. 
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 
381 U.S. at 486. 
81. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
82. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge 
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
83. In Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 7238 (Cal. S. Ct. 
Aug. 12, 2004), the state supreme court held that the city's issuance of the licenses exceeded 
its authority, and hence that the marriages were void, but it expressly declined to address the 
question whether the existing state law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated 
the state constitution. 
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restricting the definition of marriage to a union between one man and 
one woman. Whatever else can be said on the subject, it cannot be 
answered by resort to doctrinal categorization. 
CONCLUSION 
The reason the Lawrence Court could recognize that Texas's 
prohibition on same-sex intimacy violated the Due Process Clause was 
because it had already implicitly recognized that gay people are 
entitled to equal respect for their choices about how to live their lives. 
Thus Lawrence implicitly took the same "stereoscopic" approach to 
the Fourteenth Amendment that Loving had expressly used nearly 
forty years earlier, in which understandings of equality informed 
definitions of liberty. In important and perhaps unnoticed ways, 
Lawrence rests on the importance not just of loving, but also of 
Loving. 
